As for the electronics for their more advanced missiles this is 100% a real thing.

Even though we are in war-time production, the two major companies that produce them in Russia are only operating at 120% of normal production.

This is due to a limited stock of foreign-bought (western) electronics that they won't be able to easily replace once they run out.

Several country's military intelligence estimates say that they will definitely run out by the end of next year, and that is assuming that production isn't heightened at some point. If they do move into a real war-time production then they will run out much sooner.

9 minutes ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

 

Do you believe that Russian has 10K battle-ready tanks?

You don't have to guzzle down Ukrainian propaganda to know that there is zero chance of that being true.

How much value do you think a T-72 that was moth-balled in the mid-90s has in 2022?

 

Arming the DRP militias with T-62s is not indication that the Russians are running out of combat worthy tanks.  You seen to be guzzling down propaganda, if you are repeating the tank and missile shortage stories.

 

Russian Army 2021 IISS

MBT 2,840 operational (with 10,200 in storage: 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U;
200 T-90)

RECCE 1,700. IFV 5,220. (8,500 in storage) APC 6,100+

ARTILLERY 4,684+ (of this Self-propelled 1,938. MRL 876+. MOR 1,540+)

(further 5,810 in storage)

Naval Infantry (Marines)

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 330
IFV 1,100. APC 400.
ARTILLERY 405 (of this SP 181. MRL 58. )

Airborne Forces
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 160
IFV 130. APC • APC (T) 808.
ARTILLERY 600+

Border Guard Service

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR
ARTILLERY 90

National Guard

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE some BRDM-2A
IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR82A/BTR-82AM
ARTILLERY 35

 

 

Repeating myself, but 10K in storage doesn't mean anything if most of them aren't battle-worthy. The large majority of those will not have moved since the 1990s.

9 minutes ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

As for the electronics for their more advanced missiles this is 100% a real thing.

Even though we are in war-time production, the two major companies that produce them in Russia are only operating at 120% of normal production.

This is due to a limited stock of foreign-bought (western) electronics that they won't be able to easily replace once they run out.

Several country's military intelligence estimates say that they will definitely run out by the end of next year, and that is assuming that production isn't heightened at some point. If they do move into a real war-time production then they will run out much sooner.

 

These analysts have been consistently wrong about Russia's shortages, and have failed to predict the invasion itself.   Have you noticed how they rarely report on Ukraine's great weaknesses?  

 

Until the Russians stop shooting 40-30 missile launches a day there is no shortage, as the Ukrainian ground force would not be a serious force by the fall.

Oct-Nov 2022.

6 minutes ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

Repeating myself, but 10K in storage doesn't mean anything if most of them aren't battle-worthy. The large majority of those will not have moved since the 1990s.

 

Repeating a propaganda argument.   The last US pentagon estimate was 1000 Russian tanks destroyed and damaged.  And damaged tanks can be repaired.  In actual combat most tanks are repaired over and over again.  It is a minority of tanks that blow up like a fireball like in a computer game.

 

And tanks in storage can be made operational, like the 200 T-62s fitted with modern sensors and delivered to the militias.  

3 minutes ago, Cult Icon said:

 

These analysts have been consistently wrong about Russia's shortages, and have failed to predict the invasion itself.   Have you noticed how they rarely report on Ukraine's great weaknesses?  

 

Until the Russians stop shooting 40-30 missile launches a day there is no shortage, as the Ukrainian ground force would not be a serious force by the fall.

Oct-Nov 2022.

 

The analysis suggests their current stock of necessary electronics would run out sometime next year. So even the people who pointed out this weakness did not suggest this would immediately be visible in the field.

They could also try to solve the problem somewhat with some sort of shady deal with China in which they import them via that way. But I'm guessing the U.S. is watching this potential channel like a hawk already.

It doesn't really matter if the war ends in 2022!

2 minutes ago, Cult Icon said:

 

Repeating a propaganda argument.  The "losses" do not even dent what is operational.  The last US pentagon estimate was 1000 Russian tanks destroyed and damaged.  And damaged tanks can be repaired.  In actual combat most tanks are repaired over and over again.  It is a minority of tanks that blow up like a fireball like in a computer game.

 

And tanks in storage can be made operational, like the 200 T-62s fitted with modern sensors and delivered to the militias.  

 

It's not propaganda to believe that many of the 10K tanks are not battle-worthy.

You seem to interpret the 10K number as if they could throw 10K tanks into battle tomorrow.

I believe the 10K number is more two categories: tanks that could be made battle-ready with some minor work.

And then the second category: scrap metal.

I believe the second category is quite big, though it's impossible to know how big, obviously.

 

If you believe otherwise, tell me why Russia would have carefully maintained 10K tanks for decades, when there was no immediate reason to assume they would ever need them in those numbers?

1 minute ago, Cult Icon said:

It doesn't really matter if the war ends in 2022!

 

Why would you assume the war ends in 2022?

The only scenario in which that might end up remotely true is a Fall offensive on the part of Russia that is far more successful than anything we have seen from them so far.

I'll believe it when I see it.

There is no tank shortage and that argument is just wishful thinking.  

 

Russian Artillery is the decisive arm of this war.  The Russian tactic is to perform artillery offensive throughout the tactical and operational depths, and then use airpower/missile strikes at the strategic depths.  Then the Russians move up with infantry-tank groups and mop up the positions.  They do not even use predominantly professional Russian army soldiers to do this- but DRP/LRP militamen, National Guard and PMC.

 

The Ukrainian logistics have been hit for almost 130 days now and they have demonstrated very low offensive capability.  The core competency of Ukraine is in the area of propaganda and misinformation, rather than military competence.

11 minutes ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

 

Why would you assume the war ends in 2022?

The only scenario in which that might end up remotely true is a Fall offensive on the part of Russia that is far more successful than anything we have seen from them so far.

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

You can 'see it' if you are familiar with what has been going on in the battlefield.  The Ukrainians have taken huge losses, and perform poorly in the attack.  

 

The Ukrainian military is heavily degraded, much more so than the Russian.  They just suffered a strategic defeat btw..

 

4 minutes ago, Cult Icon said:

 

You can 'see it' if you are familiar with what has been going on in the battlefield.  The Ukrainians have taken huge losses, and perform poorly in the attack.  

 

The Ukrainian military is heavily degraded, much more so than the Russian.  They just suffered a strategic defeat btw..

 

 

Well I guess we will find out. Most experts seem to expect a strategic pause in late Summer, so they can start the Fall offensive in October.

2 minutes ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

 

Well I guess we will find out. Most experts seem to expect a strategic pause in late Summer, so they can start the Fall offensive in October.

 

Unless the 'experts' have access to primary sources (Russian) they come across as making biased guesses.  

 

I have followed every combat day of the war and frankly a lot of the experts I've seen in the media know a lot less about the war than I do.

13 minutes ago, Cult Icon said:

 

Unless the 'experts' have access to primary sources (Russian) they come across as making biased guesses.  

 

I have followed every combat day of the war and frankly a lot of the experts I've seen in the media know a lot less about the war than I do.

 

It's considered a basic tactic to have a 4-6 week break to allow for the logistical demands of a change of objective/new front lines.

 

In any case I will be very, very surprised if Russia realize their objectives in the South (which is essentially capturing everything up to Odessa) by New Year.

9 minutes ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

 

It's considered a basic tactic to have a 4-6 week break to allow for the logistical demands of a change of objective/new front lines.

 

In any case I will be very, very surprised if Russia realize their objectives in the South (which is essentially capturing everything up to Odessa) by New Year.

 

The length of the break (to re-accumulate supplies, refresh units) depends on what is going on right now.  It is meaningless to estimate how long it is without access to Russian military primary sources.  However the unsustainable human losses is a daily occurrence for the Ukrainian army.

 

The depth of the advance, besides logistically determined, also has a lot to do with what is going on with the defense.  So you see the Ukrainians retreating now, and the Russians are advancing much faster than usual.  This could go on for another day, or more.

 

If the Ukranian army is so degraded that only 5% of their troops are professional soldiers then Odessa Oblast could fall fairly easily.  Who knows.  However Putin/Russia is close to completing the Donbass.  The ball is in Russia's court, on how much war Putin/Russia can politically tolerate.

 

 

As for how quickly things are going, it's all relative.

The Donbas offensive has already taken longer than some of the major battles of WWII.

e.g. the Battle of Kursk.

1 hour ago, SympathysSilhouette said:

As for how quickly things are going, it's all relative.

The Donbas offensive has already taken longer than some of the major battles of WWII.

e.g. the Battle of Kursk.

 

In WW2 there were millions of men in the Ukraine, and in the region of 2.5 million Soviet troops.

 

The Russians in 2022 have less than 200K troops, and very few are infantrymen.  Russian holdings in Ukraine is like swiss cheese.

 

The Russians have a mere 200 or so infantry per 5-19 kilometers of frontline.  Even the Donbass has only one BTG per 5-6 KM of front.  However, this weakness in infantryman has been compensated by good performance of Russian artillery, which routinely defeats Ukr attacks without much Russian infantry/tank intervention.

 

Operations are snail like as the Russians are extremely casualty sensitive.  They want to shoot the Ukrainians to death first, and the mop up the remnants.  This can take a long time as they fire their munitions and repeatedly reload with new supplies.

 

The Russians spent a month after the Popsna breakout to shoot up the Ukr in the Donbass, and as a consequence the twin cities fell rather easily when they actually engaged them directly with infantry and tanks.

19 hours ago, Cult Icon said:

In practice it allowed European countries to spend a very low % of GDP on defense (especially Germany) while being under the US influence with US bases scattered all throughout NATO countries.   There is a trade impact too.   The irony is that the low % GDP on defense means that NATO members don't have much to give to Ukraine, and they did not adequately prepare Ukraine against Russia.

 

I can understand Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic countries (basically all Eastern European countries) whose nightmare is the USSR. Russia has always remained a threat for them.

 

But for Western European countries, I'm unsure of what the threat is. NATO is a "vassalage contract" where the lord (the US) protects us but asks big favours in return (restriction of freedom). Is this contract fair for us? Can the US protect us against "asymmetric warfare" like terrorism?

 

NATO also means the smothering of smaller military industries like France's (because the US military industry is a freaking supremacy). I remember this (one of the biggest insults to the French industry in the past years):

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210921-how-france-was-blindsided-by-the-australia-us-sub-deal

 

 

19 hours ago, Cult Icon said:

You remember that Putin/Russia tried to join NATO?  Doesn't make much sense if you think about it. If Russia joined NATO there is little reason for NATO to exist LOL.  

He did? I didn't remember that. That's funny, maybe he wanted to enter it to make it explode.

When was that?

These are 7/4 NASA images.  The red dots are fires, mostly caused by Russian artillery strikes.  1-2: southern front.  3-4: Izyum salient

 

4 hours ago, Enrico_sw said:

 

I can understand Poland, Czech Republic, Baltic countries (basically all Eastern European countries) whose nightmare is the USSR. Russia has always remained a threat for them.

 

But for Western European countries, I'm unsure of what the threat is. NATO is a "vassalage contract" where the lord (the US) protects us but asks big favours in return (restriction of freedom). Is this contract fair for us? Can the US protect us against "asymmetric warfare" like terrorism?

 

He did? I didn't remember that. That's funny, maybe he wanted to enter it to make it explode.

When was that?

 

What kind of restriction/favors does the US ask france?  I know a major aspect is the use of similar ammunition 5.56 NATO and equipment, shared technologies and training/information.

 

Putin was interested in getting Russia join to join NATO during the beginning of his presidency and the Clinton years.  He was also interested in improving relations between Russia and the west for years but the Crimea crisis turned him into Darth Vader.