There's been several remarkable developments over the past 3 weeks.
1. The loss of Adiivka fortified city has triggered a wave of local Russian attacks across the front, several towns were taken and others are being infiltrated, the Ukr army retreated and is now defending several towns west of Adviika. The Russians destroyed the first US M1 Abrams.
2. These are just an intensification of positional fighting but nothing that implies any serious attempt at offensive yet. Russia is still developing and holding a large reserve army that is not being used for the war in Ukraine but for a potential war with NATO ground forces. Today, Russia re-established Moscow & Leningrad military districts as planned last year.
3. It is notable that Russia has not attempted any serious armored operations since 2022, they are clearly accumulating forces and even the armor in Ukraine is very sparingly used. Ukrainian propaganda channels claim that Russian army has completely restocked their armored force in Ukraine itself and unlike in 2022 the current Russian force in Ukraine is maintained at a stable level of strength.
4. The loss of Adiivka has interestingly spooked the US-UK military, all of a sudden there is alarmist coverage on the war, like in the past it appears to aimed at trying to reboot interest and $$ for the war effort by claiming that Ukraine is out of ammo and "starting to 'lose'. " However the intensity of the propaganda is nowhere as much as in 2023 and the overall political climate in the West is weakening interest in the war. NATO-Ukraine has already admitted that they are in a strategic dead end and have no solution except fanaticism.
5. Overall it looks like it's not in Russia's interest to advance at all on the map, everytime they do the West uses it to stimulate politics of military aid. However the constant concealment of the high Ukrainian losses has the ironic result of making it safe for them to quietly conduct positional warfare with missile, artillery, and drone strikes everyday.
6. The sudden success of the Russian forces in Adiivka was accomplished by 4 infantry brigades largely staffed by reservists. These are older men in their mid-late 30s, likely with families.
Throughout the war Putin has been noticeably sparing of his reservists that were called up 2022. They had been largely used in the defense rather than offense. They have sacrificed the professional-contract troops of 2022, the convicted criminals and the Ukrainian separatists but the ordinary people with political weight inside Russia have not been used in aggressive offensive operations.
Putin has repeatedly assured Russians that he will not need to do a 2nd round of mobilization of reservists. Given the political fallout that would happen if he does I doubt that the Russian army in Ukraine will attempt aggressive offensive operations with men with families.
7. It is more and more looking like this is the beginning of the final act of the war in Ukraine. Unless NATO or Russia launch a powerful second invasion the war will end on the negotiation table after Ukraine caves in from the catastrophic damage inflicted onto it.